

AFLD documents - English

DOCUMENT 1 of 5: TRANSLATION OF DY Directeur des contrôles.pdf

Declaration of Jean-Pierre Verdy, Testing Director
French Anti-Doping Agency (*Agence française de lutte contre le dopage, AFLD*)

I, Jean-Pierre Verdy, Testing Director for the French Anti-Doping Agency, sworn in before the court of first instance (*Tribunal de Grande instance*) of the city of Evry in Essonne, declare that the doping control test that I requested of Lance Armstrong on March 17, 2009 took place in conditions that were not in conformity with the rules.

On March 17, 2009, in Saint-Jean Cap Ferrat (Alpes maritimes), Dr. Olivier Grondin, the AFLD sworn doping control officer, notified Lance Armstrong of his doping control test as he came home, returning from a training session on his bicycle.

Lance Armstrong noted Dr. Grondin's request but went inside his home without satisfying the request for the test. He came back out of the house twenty minutes later and, after the repeated requests by telephone, he then consented to let Dr. Grondin carry out sample collection.

Thus, for twenty minutes, Lance Armstrong removed himself from the visual control of the doping control officer before he consented to submit to the requested sample collections.

In the AFLD report on the 2009 Tour de France, for which the French agency was given the mandate by the Union Cycliste Internationale to carry out doping control tests, the Astana team, of which Lance Armstrong was a member, benefited from privileged information or timing advantages during doping control tests.

The attached copies of reports—Dr. Grondin's report, the AFLD report on the 2009 Tour de France, the UCI response, and the AFLD comments on the UCI response—describe in detail the conditions in which the operations took place.

Paris, 10 September 2012
[signature]

DOCUMENT 2 of 5: SKMBT_C45212100210281.pdf

[In brief, this is Investigating a possible Failure to Comply (per International Standard for Testing [IST], 2009) by AFLD DCO Dr. Olivier Grondin on his 17 March 2009 sample collection from Mr. Armstrong. This report includes a detailed, chronological description of what happened, beginning with initial contact between Dr. Grondin and Mr. Armstrong and ending with the time at which each type of sample was collected. The report documents how Mr. Armstrong removed himself from direct visual observation by Dr. Grondin for 20 minutes, despite Dr. Grondin's reminder of the requirement to remain under direct observation. During the 20 minutes, Dr. Grondin asked twice to go inside the house and talked to AFLD's Testing Director Jean-Pierre Verdy during three telephone calls. Dr. Grondin also documents times and statements regarding blood collection, and wonders whether the requirement for a 2-hour interval between the end of training and blood collection for profile purposes was actually met. Dr. Grondin spoke English, except when he spoke French with Johan Bruyneel. Dr. Grondin signed this document on March 17, 2009.]

In more detail:

DOPING CONTROL TEST REPORT
INVESTIGATING A POSSIBLE FAILURE TO COMPLY

Site ID AFLD 2009 112

Tuesday 17 March 2009

Individual No Advance Notice test during training - Mr. Lance Armstrong

Samples: Urine + Blood + Nails & Hairs

In Saint-Jean Cap Ferrat (Alpes maritimes)

Designated certified sworn collector: Doctor Olivier Grondin

NOTIFICATION

[...]

Mr. Lance Armstrong informs me that he consents to the test in his villa, that it is going to be necessary to wait 2 hours because of the test for the blood profile, but that I cannot go inside the house immediately because there are other persons present inside, that he must go see, he must make a telephone call and he will then get back to me.

Which leads me right away to remind Mr. Lance Armstrong that in conformity with WADA's 2009 International Standard for Testing, from the moment the athlete to be tested is notified, the athlete must report at that instant to the doping control place indicated [= home or office of Gendarmerie Nationale in Beaulieu-sur-Mer]; and must remain under direct and permanent observation by the designated sample collector, from the time of notification until the sample collection procedure has been completed.

It is then 16 hours and 10 minutes by my watch.

However, Mr. Lance Armstrong leaves me to go inside his villa, without giving me any indication to follow him, leaving me by myself in front of the gate.

[During the next 20 minutes, Dr. Grondin asked two persons to let him know Mr. Armstrong's decision: submit to testing or not, and allow Dr. Grondin to go inside the house or not: first Dr. Grondin asked a team staff member who was unloading a team car, then he asked Bruyneel. During the same 20 minutes, Dr. Grondin also talked to AFLD's Testing Director Jean-Pierre Verdy during three telephone calls. First Verdy called Grondin and Grondin gave a status report; second, Verdy called Grondin for an update and told him that in case of ongoing difficulty, Grondin could call the gendarmerie nationale [law

enforcement agency]; third, Grondin called Verdy, who happened to overhear Bruyneel telling Grondin that Grondin was about to be able to go inside. The team staff member and Bruyneel come across as unconcerned.]

At 16 hours 29, Mr. Johan Bruynheel [misspelled in original document] indicates to me that I may go inside the villa.

I then find Mr. Lance Armstrong again, seated at the dining room table, looking at a cell phone.

It is 16 hour 30 minutes and I immediately fill out the doping control form, documenting that 20 minutes have passed with no sign of life from Mr. Lance Armstrong between the time of his verbal notification and the time when Mr. Johan Bruynheel authorized me to go inside the villa to find Mr. Lance Armstrong again.

[...]

SAMPLE COLLECTION
[unremarkable]

COMMENTS BY MR LANCE ARMSTRONG ON THE PROCEDURE
None

PERSONAL REMARKS ON THE DOPING CONTROL TEST OF MR LANCE ARMSTRONG
[Dr. Grondin refers to the Jan 2009 IST, 5.4.1 (which requires the athlete to be responsible for remaining under direct observation by the doping control official), 5.4.2, 5.4.4 (which allows the doping control official to consider a reasonable request by the athlete to delay reporting to the doping control station or leave the doping control station temporarily), 7.4.2, including, from the latter, the option of “Investigating a possible Failure to Comply.” Dr. Grondin comments that Mr. Armstrong certainly did not comply with 5.4.1, and did not make any request as in 5.4.4.]

For 20 minutes and despite my repeated requests to go inside Mr. Armstrong’s villa, he deliberately removed himself from any direct observation by me.

At no time did Mr. Armstrong indicate to me personally how he was occupied during these 20 minutes.

[Dr. Grondin then notes that there is a question about whether the requirement to let 2 hours pass between the end of training and the blood-profiling collection, was met, because the time at which training ended varies depending on Mr. Armstrong’s verbal and written statements or Mr. Johan Bruyneel statement.]

DOCUMENT 3 of 5: TourdeFrance2009-BilanAFLD.pdf

[In brief, this is a summary by AFLD of the 2009 Tour de France Doping Control Operations. This summary mentions the agreement signed on 10 June 2009 by UCI President Pat McQuaid and AFLD President Pierre Bordry, which details the doping control procedures, based on targetting as recommended by Code 5.1.3. AFLD notes that it acts as service provider and that per Code 15.1.1, the IF has the last word over doping control for an international event. This summary is based on the journal notes of the two physicians sent by AFLD to collect urine and blood samples, on their verbal reports to three AFLD officials (President, General Secretary, Testing Director), and on the mission report by the person in charge of chaperones. This summary presents AFLD's point of view as it was to be communicated to persons in charge at UCI, and copied to WADA and the French cycling federation. Seven departures from the IST or UCI ADR are numbered and described by quoting the relevant article, then commenting on the departures. Structural difficulties likely arise from the relationship, closeness, and even friendship between IF officials and athletes, whereas doping control requires independence and neutrality. This AFLD summary paints a picture of lack of rigor by UCI, and states that the Astana team benefited from preferential treatment by UCI officials.]

In more detail:

I. Departures observed from applicable international texts

1. Keeping No Advance Notice doping control tests unannounced
 - International Standard for Testing 4.3.10, UCI ADR 134, 137
 - [UCI inspectors don't seem to take all useful precautions to keep upcoming tests confidential, such as tests in hotels before or after the race.] It is not very professional to talk about such tests (very) loudly in a dining room where riders are present, especially on the day before a test, such as was the case in Barcelona on Thursday night, 7 July.

For No Advance Notice tests at hotels, UCI inspectors required chaperones to refrain from knocking on riders' room doors, and to wait instead for team directors to appear at reception desks, which lessened the unannounced character of the tests considerably.

[In Documents 3-5 of 5, AFLD and UCI end up mostly agreeing that the chaperone coordinator, M. Witkowski, was in charge of posting the names of riders to be tested approximately 7 km (or 10-15 minutes) [not "often 30 minutes", enough time for manipulation] before the stage finish.]

[In Documents 3-5 of 5, AFLD and UCI disagree on the facts about a Rabobank rider who was told by his director before the start of the stage that he was going to be tested.]

2. Requirement for chaperones
 - International Standard for Testing 5.2, UCI ADR 142
 - [A team of 8 chaperones was available, but UCI inspectors deliberately decided not to use them for blood collections before the start of the Tour and in the morning before the first stage, for targeted tests.] After everything was back in order, a new departure was noted during the tests to be conducted on the morning of Saturday July 11, in the Astana team hotel. The UCI inspectors chose not to use chaperone services, allegedly because the chaperones would have been the source of certain leaks, which are more likely linked to departures from confidentiality rules by said inspectors (see Thursday night, July 7 in Barcelona [loud dining room conversation]). In any event, the use of chaperones is mandatory and could not be eliminated unilaterally by the UCI because the riders to be tested were spread in five different hotels. Furthermore, the UCI was not well organized because for the first four days, the chaperones did not have enough vests (only 5 vests for 8 chaperones).

3. Notification forms
 - UCI ADR 138
 - [Lack of the rigor needed to avoid potential procedural irregularity. UCI did not provide enough copies of the notification form. Photocopies had to be used. UCI inspectors did not keep the copies signed by the riders, until AFLD physicians protested.]
4. Delays in reporting for doping control
 - International Standard for Testing 5.4, UCI ADR 143
 - It appears that a delay of 30 minutes has been defined by the UCI for a rider to report to the doping control station after notification, except, according to instructions that would have been provided by Mrs. Anne Gripper, the UCI Anti-Doping Services Manager, for riders asked for TV or other media interviews. Accordingly, stage winners and riders at the top of different rankings regularly reported one hour, even an hour and a half, after crossing the finish line.

In addition, it appears, from the AFLD physicians' reports, that the requirement to report immediately for sample collection was not met on the morning of Saturday July 11 in the Astana team hotel, following the UCI inspectors' intervention. The UCI inspectors deemed that it was appropriate, for diplomacy's sake, to delay the tests because blood collections had been carried out the day before on riders of this same team. Therefore, between the arrival of the physicians at the hotel at 8:10 a.m. and the first collection at 8:55 a.m., 45 minutes elapsed, for the [smallest non-conformity]. Such tolerance, granted without real justification, does not appear to be in conformity with the requirement to treat tested athletes equally and, in the absence of chaperones, it prevents the verification of perfect conformity, including in particular verifying that there was no manipulation.

[On preventing the testing of Astana team riders on July 25:]

In other cases, for example on Saturday July 25, it was not possible to carry out the blood collections scheduled for the Astana team riders, because the travel time to their hotel, which was about 60 km away, was not estimated correctly by the UCI inspectors.

5. OOC vs in-competition tests
 - [AFLD quotes definitions, then comments that UCI inspectors mislabeled in-competition samples as OOC, "an error with heavy consequences" since the prohibited substances differ.]
6. Sample collection [On the photographer in the doping control station:]
 - International Standard for Testing 6.3, 6.3.3 a), UCI ADR 144
 - Although the athlete selected for testing may be accompanied by a person of his or her choice, this person cannot in any case disturb the procedure by taking photographs without authorization from the sample collectors, let alone attend and take photos during urination. This is, however, what took place during a No Advance Notice test of Mr. Lance Armstrong, carried out at this hotel on Friday July 24. A photographer [female per French grammar] reporting on the rider, without being introduced and without authorization from the AFLD sample collector or from the UCI inspector, entered the toilet area and took photos without respect for the rider's [intimacy], and risked invalidating the testing procedure.
7. Sample storage and shipping
 - International Standard for Testing 9.3, 9.3.1, 9.3.2 & comment
 - [UCI failed to provide coolers, so samples have lacked proper refrigeration and this could lead to deterioration and analytical difficulties.]

II. IF/NADO collaboration, structural difficulties

[Structural difficulties likely arise from the relationship, closeness, and even friendship between IF officials and athletes, whereas doping control requires independence and neutrality.]

Without casting doubt on the integrity of UCI inspectors and other collaborators, one must note that they often maintain friendly or camaraderie relationships with a number of riders or team officials. Such a situation is not favorable for the strict, but reasoned application of antidoping rules. The weight of history and of age-old practices can also lead to departures from rules. When the presence of a rider is added to this classic situation, a rider who is for sure out of the ordinary and who participates in the success of the sport event as well as in the staging of a great public health cause, it is no surprise that a slightly different treatment, which some will call a preferential treatment, is applied to this rider, who is otherwise prone to [being closely watched], and by extension to his team.

This is undoubtedly the origin of the practices seen by the physicians and chaperones, [who agree to note that] the Astana team benefited from preferential treatment (always the last to be tested in the morning, delays in reporting to the sample collector) on the part of UCI officials.

[On UCI's failure to communicate sufficient whereabouts information:]

Regarding the collaboration between AFLD and UCI for the Tour de France, note that the UCI did communicate a certain amount of information on team whereabouts during pre-tour preparation, but never about the Astana team. [...]

[AFLD recommends streamlining staff to protect confidentiality and facilitate quick decisions when needed; wonders whether the two UCI inspectors were best suited to collaborate with AFLD; expresses concern about some pharmaceuticals carried by teams and recommends creating a pool of independent MDs; wishes for independent observers such as WADA's, whose made recommendations for optimization in 2003, some of which have room to be reiterated in 2009.]

DOCUMENT 4 of 5: SKMBT_C45212100210282.pdf

[In brief, this is the UCI's response to the AFLD's Summary the 2009 Tour de France doping control operations (= document 3 of 5 TourdeFrance2009-BilanAFLD.pdf). The UCI questions the AFLD's and Mr. Bordry's (AFLD president) motives behind the AFLD's summary, points out AFLD imperfections (departures, incompetence, lab ownership = lack of lab independence, breach of confidentiality, lack of reliability of AFLD DCOs, major problems working with AFLD for three other, unidentified IFs). The UCI rebuts the AFLD Summary point by point (based on the AFLD claims being false, exaggerated, incorrect, irrelevant to sample integrity, based on an incorrect understanding of rules or misrepresentation of facts; reflecting confusion, lacking info on modern antidoping techniques, etc.). The UCI is proud of its antidoping efforts, which in its view, far exceed what is generally considered satisfactory in the fight against doping. The UCI has worked with 20 NADOs and found the AFLD to be the most difficult to work with. "The UCI is disappointed and angry that a partner in the international fight against doping chose to submit such a report without basis, a report which undermines the public's and riders' trust in the 2009 Tour de France antidoping program considerably."]

In more detail:

Preferential treatment

One of the most serious and most baseless declarations of the AFLD concerns preferential treatment for the Astana team riders. This is a problem that was already mentioned by the AFLD around mid-July during the Tour de France. President Pat McQuaid examined this problem as soon as he became aware of it during the Tour de France and responded in detail to Mr. Bordry. The fact that he mentions this question again shows his total disregard for facts and partnership. Now that the Tour is over, it is even more obvious that the Astana team did absolutely not receive preferential treatment, except in the sense that its riders were subjected to many more doping control tests than other riders. The Astana riders, who represented 5% of the total number of participants, were subjected to 81 doping control tests, or more than 10% of the total number of tests carried out. In fact, the Astana team leaders was tested three times more than most of the other Tour riders.

1. Keeping No Advance Notice doping control tests unannounced

[On the very loud non-confidential dining room conversation]

This is completely false.

The basic facts on which these accusations are based are incorrect. The riders stayed in Barcelona on July 9, not July 7, as declared by the AFLD.

The UCI DCOs did not speak to teams or riders about their testing plans, be it in a public place or at any time during the Tour de France. During the night of July 9, the UCI DCOs shared a table during a meal with the UCI commissaires and did not discuss their antidoping activities at all.

2. Not using chaperones

This is an exaggerated comment.

In fact, chaperones were used to notify riders of early morning blood tests, except on the mornings of July 3, 4 and 11.

[UCI doesn't use as many chaperones as riders tested, for efficiency's sake, especially when many tests (e.g., 200 in one morning) are conducted. Article 139 of the UCI ADR allows the rider to be notified via his team manager.]

[...]

Chaperones were used from July 5 on during the whole Tour de France, except on July 11, for two reasons:

- i) Because of a problem reported by the UCI DCOs: there would have been information leaks by chaperones, about riders to be tested the same morning

ii) Because the chaperones were too far from the hotels where the tests were to take place.

4. [On delays in reporting for doping control:]

This comment is very much based on mis-information. [UCI states that AFLD misunderstands/misinterprets the IST 5.4.4 and the UCI ADR 143 and 183, that UCI staff have seen athletes report for testing well over an hour after the end of the event, including in other sports, and it's not a problem for sample validity.]

[On delaying Astana team tests by more than 45 minutes on the morning of July 11:]

This question was fully studied and examined by telephone and emails with Mr. Bordry during the Tour de France.

Furthermore, an official letter was sent to Mr. Bordry on August 5, categorically assuring to him that the Astana riders had not received preferential treatment. In fact, the decisions concerning the delay in testing on the morning of July 11 were made after consulting one of the AFLD physicians. As declared publicly by the UCI President, two Astana team members informed the antidoping team of their late arrival at the hotel, due to a delay in transportation, preventing the riders from going to bed until midnight. Therefore, they decided to grant an extra hour of sleep to the Astana team before breakfast. Given that these riders were not informed of the presence of the antidoping officials and AFLD physicians, the latter decided to delay the awakening of the riders by 35 minutes. The Astana team did not leave the antidoping team during this whole time period.

The riders were not informed of the presence of the doping control team prior to their notification to report to the doping control station. The delay between notification and doping control test was only ten minutes, as was the case for all the team tested that morning. The UCI is convinced that there was no intention (by the members of the UCI staff) to give the riders an opportunity to manipulate blood samples at any time during the Tour de France.

[On preventing the testing of Astana team riders on July 25:]

This assertion distorts the facts.

[Three riders were to be tested. Traffic was thick. When the testers arrived, the riders were already in the team bus to make it to the stage start despite thick traffic. Astana team officials proposed to testers to go in the bus to test the riders, but AFLD and UCI people agreed not to because of their other obligations. The riders were tested that afternoon. Astana riders underwent more tests than any other team on July 25 and other days. UCI always agreed with every suggestion by AFLD to test specific riders.]

[...]

6. [On the photographer in the doping control station:]

This event had no impact on sample integrity.

Like all athletes, Mr. Armstrong had the right to have a representative of his choice to accompany him during the administrative procedures concerning sample collection. Although this is not encouraged, there is no UCI or IST rule expressly prohibiting the taking of photographs. In and of itself, allowing a representative to be present during sample collection is a violation of article 144 of the UCI ADR, unless the athlete is a minor or handicapped. However, it is the UCI's opinion that if a rider agrees to a photographer being present and taking photos, even during sample collection, this doesn't put in question the validity of the sample.

In the case of interest, the photographer did not follow the instructions of the AFLD physician, which were to leave the "toilet zone." The UCI DCO was unaware of the difficulties since he was at that moment carrying out tasks in the "administrative zone of the doping control station." When the photographer returned to the "administrative zone," the UCI DCO hid the confidential parts of the form

with his hands and explained that taking photos of the confidential parts of doping control was not allowed.

Following this fact, the UCI decided to inform riders of their duty to discourage the presence of a third party near a rider while he produces a sample.

[...]

II. [On IF/NADO collaboration, structural difficulties]

[...]

In particular, in reference to the comments regarding Lance Armstrong, the UCI can confirm that he received no preferential treatment. [He underwent a large number of tests, more than most riders, etc.]

[...]

Regarding the assertion that the Astana team riders received preferential treatment, it is simply not true that the Astana riders were always tested after the other riders. Morning tests were based on visits to the different hotels where riders were staying, i.e., in different locations, and the order of the tests was scheduled as a function of the distance between the hotels to ensure the best route from a logistical point of view. In fact, there was only one day during the whole Tour de France when the Astana team riders were tested last.

[On UCI's failure to communicate sufficient whereabouts information: UCI sent numerous emails to Verdy, yet AFLD conducted only a small number of OOC tests and none on Astana team riders.]

[On AFLD physicians and UCI DCOs relationship: they worked well together; AFLD physicians once saw the UCI Testing Director and did not voice any concerns; UCI accepted every suggestion by AFLD Testing Director Verdy about which riders to test.]

[On sharing blood profile info: only with express authorization from riders.] UCI is under the impression that AFLD requests confidential information so it can blame those who have no choice but to deny such requests.

DOCUMENT 5 of 5: TourdeFrance2009-CommentairesAFLD.pdf

[In brief, this is the AFLD’s response to the UCI’s response (= document 4 of 5, SKMBT_C45212100210282.pdf). AFLD finds the UCI’s tone often very aggressive, and states that the UCI response fails to present sufficient clarification to [cast doubt on] the AFLD Summary overall [conclusions]. Some antidoping programs (such as the UCI’s) value quantity (sheer number of blood and urine tests), others (such as the AFLD’s) value quality (targeting tests and keeping them as unannounced as possible). Whereas UCI presents philosophical digressions and unverifiable accusations, AFLD limits itself to the facts. It’s only because UCI repeatedly failed to correct issues discussed by telephone by Bordry with his UCI homolog that AFLD wrote up its Summary of the 2009 Tour de France Doping Control Operations.]

In more detail:

Preferential treatment

The UCI considers the possibility of preferential treatment for the Astana team riders to be completely without basis. To eliminate this hypothesis, the UCI resorts once more to purely quantitative arguments: “The Astana riders represented 5% of the total number of participants, were subjected to 81 doping control tests, or more than 10% of the total number of tests carried out,” and “the Astana team leaders was tested three times more than most of the other Tour riders.”

The AFLD stands by the facts noted in its initial report. It is not particularly surprising that the team that includes 2 of the 3 top ranked competitors and which is declared top team was tested more times than less visible teams. But beyond the number of tests, it’s obviously the conditions in which they were carried out that are key and it’s those aspects that the AFLD commented about.

1. Keeping No Advance Notice doping control tests unannounced

[On the very loud non-confidential dining room conversation, AFLD stands corrected in that was on July 9, not 7, but stands by its facts, corroborated by two AFLD DCOs who were present that night at dinner in the Catalonia hotel restaurant in Barcelona, when 11 blood collections to be carried out the next morning in Barcelona were discussed. This point is all the more important because the UCI inspectors blamed the chaperones for this leak, then used that as an excuse to keep chaperones out of the loop for hotel collections on the morning of July 11.]

[AFLD comments that minor imperfections add up to paint a picture of UCI’s lack of professionalism.]

4. [On delays in reporting for doping control, AFLD characterizes UCI’s view of the permissible 30 minutes as a right, in contrast with AFLD’s view that it is merely a tolerance that requires justification.]

[On delaying Astana team blood collections on July 11, AFLD acknowledges that the situation was indeed discussed by phone and email with Mr. Bordry during the Tour—because he’s the one who took the initiative. UCI seems to think that categorically claiming that the Astana riders did not benefit from preferential treatment is sufficient proof, but that is not the case. The fact that the decisions about the delayed tests on the morning of July 11 were made after consulting an AFLD physician doesn’t add anything since this physician was under the UCI inspector’s responsibility.

As for the reason given to let the riders sleep longer, the first reason that was given was that some of these riders had already given a blood sample the day before, before the UCI response mentioned a “late arrival at the hotel, due to a delay in transportation, which kept the riders from going to bed until midnight.” Although the UCI asserts that “the riders were not informed of the presence of the antidoping officials and AFLD physicians” and “the Astana team leaders did not leave the antidoping team during this whole period of time,” it is well known that such claims, which are not questioned/doubted a priori, do not withstand the complexity of actual possibilities.

This is why this “diplomatic” decision poses a problem because it leaves room for doubt, where respect for the procedure would have made it possible to guarantee the conformity of these tests. This delay, taken together with the totally inopportune choice of not using chaperones, can only catch the observer’s attention, considering the scientific techniques that can be used to beat the test.]

[On preventing the testing of Astana team riders on July 25: whereas the UCI deems that the AFLD report misrepresents the facts, AFLD states that considering heavy vacationers traffic on a July Saturday, common sense indicated and the AFLD collectors recommended that the collection time be moved up, but that’s not what the UCI inspectors chose to do.

So when the doping control team arrived, the riders were already in the team bus, ready, as indicated by the UCI response, “for a departure earlier than planned to the stage departure point, due to traffic conditions,” which shows that common sense was shared.]

6. [On the photographer in the doping control station: Once more, the UCI chose to minimize the consequences of a very important departure from procedure, for the sole reason that “this event has no impact on sample integrity.” Astonishing leniency for events concerning only one rider, Lance Armstrong...

If, as the UCI claims, “Mr. Armstrong had the right to have a representative of his choice to accompany him during the admin procedures concerning sample collection,” it is clear that such was not the role of this photographer, who did not introduce herself, whose presence was of course not mentioned on the doping control form, and who took photos well beyond the admin procedure despite repeated opposition by the AFLD collector.

If one follows the UCI’s reasoning on this point, it is now possible for a third party to do practically anything they want during a doping control test as long as it doesn’t impact sample integrity! No need to adopt rules, since the responsible authority doesn’t view their respect as mandatory.]

II.[...]

[The UCI takes special care to try to rebut the notion of potential preferential treatment toward Lance Armstrong. This “rebuttal” has two parts, the first one based on principle, then the production of quantitative elements that will convince only those who think that numbers are sufficient to characterize the effectiveness of doping control tests.

The UCI then notes that some of Lance Armstrong’s samples are so concentrated that they indicate, not an attempt at dilution as the AFLD would imply, but the contrary, i.e. dehydration. The UCI jumps on the opportunity to stigmatize the AFLD who would “create suspicion without looking at facts” The truth is that the AFLD was referring, in this type of situation, not only to dilution, but to all kinds of more sophisticated techniques to alter either bladder content or urine quality.]

[On UCI’s failure to communicate Astana team’s whereabouts: AFLD agrees that there were many e-mails, but the problem was that the e-mails disclosed whereabouts with too little notice (e.g., e-mail today about the day after tomorrow), so it was impractical to implement doping control tests.] ...whereabouts info was lacking, particularly for the Astana team.